The Bührle scandal, uncovered in 1968, concerned covert deliveries of war materiel by Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Oerlikon-Bührle to South Africa, Israel, Nigeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Lebanon. These recipient states were subject to Swiss export restrictions. From December 1963 to 1968, the unauthorised exports had a total value of 88’919’904 Swiss francs, around 16 per cent of the company’s arms sales revenue at the time. Forged end-use and non-re-export declarations were used to obtain licences for other destination countries. The weapons subsequently reached their actual recipients. The purported destinations included Ethiopia, France and Belgium. Between April 1964 and March 1968, deliveries worth 54’243’245 Swiss francs went to South Africa, including 36 twin 35 mm guns. Switzerland’s export ban on South Africa had been in force since December 1963. Deliveries to the Nigerian government during the Biafran War helped expose the affair. On 12 June 1968, Switzerland’s ambassador in Lagos, Fritz Real, sent concrete evidence to Bern and called for an investigation. The possibility that Swiss guns might endanger the ICRC’s humanitarian supply flights intensified public debate. In mid-October 1968, the Federal Council instructed the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland to investigate. Federal Councillor Willy Spühler did not inform the public of the illegal exports until 19 December 1968. On 27 November 1970, the Federal Supreme Court, then acting as the federal criminal court, sentenced Dieter Bührle to a suspended eight-month prison term and a fine of 20’000 Swiss francs. His conviction concerned knowingly tolerating unauthorised deliveries to South Africa. Three employees received suspended prison sentences of 15 to 18 months. The affair led to parliamentary interventions and tighter export controls. The popular initiative for stronger arms controls and a ban on arms exports was rejected in 1972, with 49.7 per cent voting in favour. The War Materiel Act, which entered into force in 1973, restricted exports to areas of conflict and tension. Historical research uncovered a larger set of South African orders than the individual deliveries covered by the judgment: 30 35 mm guns affected by the export ban were exported between summer 1964 and May 1965. In August 1965, South Africa ordered another 90 guns for 52.7 million Swiss francs and 45 Superfledermaus fire-control units for 54 million Swiss francs. As late as August 1969, 16 guns were shipped via Genoa. These transactions partly overlap with the matters dealt with in court; their quantities and values must therefore not be added to the judgment’s figures. The last delivery fell outside the period covered by the proceedings. In 1963, South Africa was the largest buyer of Swiss war materiel. On 7 August 1963, UN Security Council Resolution 181 called for an arms embargo; the UN embargo became binding only on 4 November 1977. Switzerland imposed its own export ban in December 1963. Between February 1966 and September 1968, Oerlikon-Bührle illegally supplied war materiel worth 17’504’537 Swiss francs to Israel, including 381’098 rounds of 30 mm ammunition and 4’050 8 cm rockets. Forged end-use declarations named France and Iran as the destination countries. Between July 1967 and March 1968, despite Switzerland’s export ban, Oerlikon-Bührle supplied Nigeria with 96 20 mm guns and 100’000 rounds of ammunition worth 5’447’436 Swiss francs. Forged non-re-export declarations falsely presented Ethiopia as the recipient. The deliveries took place during the Biafran War. On 12 June 1968, Ambassador Fritz Real sent concrete evidence to Bern; its disclosure triggered the Bührle scandal. Concern for the safety of ICRC relief flights shaped the debate. The deliveries to Israel also included 100’000 fuzes, 50 drum magazines, 2’000 time fuzes, 370’000 fuze primers and various radar components. A Federal Council decision had prohibited deliveries of war materiel to Israel and Arab states since 8 November 1955. Nine false French and three false Iranian end-use declarations supported 24 export applications; three applications also partly concerned South Africa. Five further applications for time fuzes and radar equipment were submitted without end-use declarations. With two exceptions, the licences requested were granted. The Israel figure of 17’504’537 Swiss francs is included in the total value of the scandal dealt with in court.