Controversial measuring devices for Khamenei’s Iran
Goods category: Not covered as listed dual-use goods; special notification duty under the Goods Control Act (catch-all). No judicial proof of a weapons delivery.
Ali Khamenei, Nowruz address, 20.03.2017 according to the file page.
In February 2005, a dealer arranged delivery of three technical devices from Switzerland via Kuala Lumpur to a customer in Tehran. The documents established the detour through Malaysia and the Iranian order. He said they were one locating device and two frequency-measuring devices. In August 2004, SECO had imposed a special notification requirement on him for certain exports to Iran after refusing two cable exports in 2003 and 2004. Further deliveries in 2004–2006 were included in the indictment.
According to the official SECO report obtained, the devices delivered in 2005 were not on any Goods Control Act list. On 16 October 2009, the Federal Supreme Court overturned the conviction of 26 March 2009: breach of a notification requirement could not be punished as an unauthorised export of listed goods. On reconsideration in 2011, the remaining regulatory offence was time-barred. On 10 April 2012, the Federal Supreme Court also overturned a compensatory claim of 12’673.95 Swiss francs. Failure to notify alone did not establish an objectively unlawful delivery; promotion of a nuclear, biological or chemical weapons programme was not part of the charge.
Effect of the proposed War Materiel Act revision
Under the new Article 22b, the Federal Council could depart from all the licensing criteria in Article 22a under vaguely defined ‘exceptional circumstances’. The public would not have to be informed.
The Federal Council could add Iran to Annex 2 by amending the War Materiel Ordinance. This would remove the exclusion criterion based on participation in an armed conflict and make approval the rule. The Federal Council could refuse a licence only in exceptional cases.
Article 18 paragraph 1 would abolish non-re-export declarations in the vast majority of cases. Weapons for Iran could thus easily be supplied through a subsidiary or intermediary in a third country.