In 2012, RUAG hand grenades delivered to the United Arab Emirates in 2003 were found in Syria. Some had been transferred via Jordan. Further finds involved armed groups, including forces close to al-Qaeda. In 2018, finds with the so-called Islamic State were also reported; a link to the same supply chain was considered likely. On 4 July 2012, SECO provisionally suspended war materiel exports to the Emirates while the origin of the grenades photographed in Syria was investigated. The photographs revealed in 2018 came from a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham raid on an IS cell on 8 August. RUAG OHG92 and HG85 grenades were identified in the published images. Photographs taken in early July 2012 at a Free Syrian Army depot in Hritan near Aleppo had already shown OHG92s and HG85s. RUAG linked OHG92s marked SM 6-03-1 to production and delivery to the Emirates in 2003; SECO put that delivery at 225’162 hand grenades. The 2018 raid took place in Nayrab, Idlib province. As the serial numbers were unreadable in the published images, the link between these later finds and the 2003 delivery remained uncertain. In a September 2018 statement, RUAG said it had supplied no hand grenades to the Arab region since 2003–2004. The newly pictured grenades could originate from those earlier deliveries; a conclusive assessment would require readable serial numbers or other unambiguous identifiers. Following the March 2014 attack in Niğde, Turkey, in which three people died, Swiss RUAG hand grenades were found with one of the perpetrators. RTS and 20 Minuten published different quantities on 31 July 2016: RTS reported two grenades, while 20 Minuten reported four. Both cited SonntagsBlick and the indictment. The reports named HG85 and OHG92 types and the markings SM8-03 and SM6-03; 20 Minuten gave the second marking more fully as SM6-03 1. The individual concerned had grown up in Brugg. Life sentences had been handed down in the case in June 2016. The reporting linked the grenades to RUAG’s 2003 delivery to the United Arab Emirates and described onward transfers to Turkey via Jordan and Syria. Accounts differ on details of this route. A fully documented supply chain for every grenade is therefore not available. The discovery does not establish that these grenades caused the three deaths. Amnesty International documented Swiss hand grenades transferred by the United Arab Emirates to a militia in Yemen. In March 2016, dealers in Tripoli offered RUAG hand grenades and B&T GL06 grenade launchers in closed online groups. Investigations by SonntagsBlick and ARES revealed the offers in September 2018. OHG92 grenades were identified in the images. Based on the visible features, RUAG said they probably came from a batch delivered to the United Arab Emirates in 2003. Their onward route to Libya remained unclear. It was also unclear whether the grenade launcher had been manufactured in Switzerland or abroad under licence. A further investigation in 2020 revisited the offers documented in 2016. In early April 2021, ARES documented an online offer for seven RUAG HG85 hand grenades in north-western Syria. The investigation extends the documented period of their further proliferation. ARES links markings on regionally documented HG85/OHG92 grenades to known export batches delivered to the Emirates in 2003–2004. The offer establishes neither a completed sale nor a new Swiss export in 2021; a complete supply chain remains unverified for each grenade offered.